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Rhode Island's Forgotten
Bill of Rights
Kevin D. Leitao*
1. INTRODUCTION
State constitutional law is emerging as a powerful basis for
the assertion of fundamental liberties. Scholars, judges and advo-
cates are all involved in the current renaissance of state constitu-
tions.' Litigants now frequently look to state courts to establish
broader civil rights protections under state constitutional law than
exist under the federal constitution.2 The interpretation of civil
* Corporate Counsel, The O'Connor Group. A.B. 1986 Brown University; M.
Phil. 1988 Cambridge University; J.D. 1991 Yale Law School.
1. See generally, Developments in Law, The Interpretation of State Constitu-
tional Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 (1982) (describing several approaches to state
constitutional interpretation of civil rights protections); William J. Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977)
(recounting the separate historical development and application of state bills of
rights); see also, Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills
of Right, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980) (advocating that state courts first interpret
state constitutional protections in deciding cases and examine federal constitution
law only if necessary).
2. See, e.g., State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1980) (holding that the Rhode
Island Constitution prohibited a warrantless search permissible under the U.S.
Constitution); overruled by State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010 (R.I. 1992) (holding
that state protections against search and seizure are identical to those guaranteed
by the United States Constitution). In Benoit, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
rejected a criminal defendant's challenge under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution to a warrantless search, citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970). In interpreting Article I, Section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution, how-
ever, the state supreme court ruled in favor of the defendant's challenge, and based
its reasoning on the position adopted by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Cham-
bers. State v. Holiday, 280 A.2d 333 (R.I. 1971) (holding that Rhode Island's con-
stitutional provision protecting the right to appointed counsel is broader than
protection under the United States Constitution); see also State v. Moretti, 521
A.2d 1003 (R.I. 1987) and State v. Medeiros, 535 A.2d 766 (R.I. 1987) in which the
Rhode Island Supreme Court followed its decision in Moretti; but see In re Advisory
Opinion (Appointed Counsel), 666 A.2d 813 (R.I. 1995) (abrogating Holliday, Mo-
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rights provisions in state constitutions raises the same issues re-
garding the relevance of history and original intent as are ana-
lyzed in the interpretation of the federal constitution. 3 Just as
James Madison's notes of the Philadelphia Convention and Elliot's
Debates have been carefully studied, state constitutional conven-
tions deserve similar scrutiny because they are central to under-
standing the intent and context of state constitutional
development. Indeed, these issues are often more complicated on
the state level because many states have had two or more constitu-
tions since the creation of their government. 4
An examination of Rhode Island's constitutional convention of
1790, held to consider ratification of the U.S. Constitution, reveals
more than the original understanding and historical context of the
Rhode Island convention's view of the U.S. Constitution. Existing
accounts of the 1790 convention reveal that the State of Rhode Is-
land has a forgotten bill of rights enacted by the people in the con-
stitutional convention which ratified the United States
Constitution. This Declaration of Rights was the first constitu-
tional document created by the sovereign people of Rhode Island.
Once ratified, the Declaration of Rights of the People of Rhode Is-
land fell into virtual total obscurity. There is no record of any en-
forcement of rights under it. Indeed, extensive research has
revealed only three individuals who have referred to the document
as a basis for asserting fundamental rights. 5
retti and Medeiros by finding the right to counsel under the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion no greater than the protection afforded by the United States Constitution).
While Rhode Island appears to have retrenched in reading its constitution more
broadly than that of the United States Constitution, the point nonetheless remains
that this is an active area of litigation for the assertion of fundamental liberties.
See Michael DiBiase, Reviving Rhode Island State Constitutional Rights: The Need
for a New Approach to Constitutional Questions, 35 R.I.B.J. 5 (1987) (advocating
that Rhode Island courts should apply state constitutional provisions first, rather
than as a supplement to the application of federal constitutional protections).
3. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18
Ga. L. Rev. 165, 183-184 (1984) [hereinafter E Pluribus]. Despite the relevance of
history to state constitutional interpretation, The Michie Company, publishers of
the General Laws of Rhode Island, 1956 Enactment (1978 ed.), does not include
historical or reenactment annotations on provisions of the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion. Such annotations are provided only for statutory provisions.
4. For example, Rhode Island has had two constitutions since 1776. In con-
trast, Georgia has had ten constitutions during the same period. E Pluribus, supra
note 2, at 165.
5. First, Seth Luther, a working-class activist in Rhode Island during the
1830's, stated that the system of freehold suffrage was "contrary to the Declaration
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A review of the Declaration of Rights of 1790, the convention
that ratified it, and later constitutional conventions in Rhode Is-
land suggests that some of the rights declared in this forgotten doc-
ument may still be enforceable. If so, the people of Rhode Island
may be able to assert certain fundamental liberties today based on
this obscure proclamation of rights.
This article will argue that this Declaration of Rights was
"higher law," that is constitutional law, 6 because it was proposed
of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, the Bill of Rights of the
State of Rhode Island, and the dictates of common sense." Patrick Conley, Democ-
racy in Decline, 238 (1977) (quoting Seth Luther: An Address on the Rights of Free
Suffrage). For a brief narrative on Seth Luther, see Marvin E. Gettleman, The
Dorr Rebellion: A Study in American Radicalism, 1833-1849, 18-22 (1973). Sec-
ond, Thomas Wilson Dorr, who led a rebellion against the Charter government in
1842, cited the 1790 Declaration of Rights on several occassions. In the so-called
"Nine Lawyers' Opinion" on the "Right of the People to Form a Constitution," Dorr
cited the "Declaration of 1790" in support of his argument that the people can
choose whatever means they deem most proper to alter or abolish an existing con-
stitution, regardless of the method prescribed for amendment of that Constitution.
See Rhode Island Historical Tracts, (Sydney S. Rider ed., 1880). The final refer-
ence is found in the formidable argument of Benjamin Franklin Hallett before the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1 (1849). Hallett's argument was published separately as B.F. Hallett, The
Right of the People to Establish Forms of Government, (1848). In his address,
Hallett asked "After this [Declaration of Independence] what were the authentic
acts of the people, or the nearest to it, establishing a form of government?" His
answer included the following,
It [the Rhode Island Convention of 1790] was the nighest to any au-
thentic act of the people which her history exhibits down to 1841; and
hence its actions had a higher sanction than that of any Legislative body.
May 29, 1790, the Convention ratified the Constitution of the United
States, and at the same time adopted and proclaimed a Bill of Rights.
On this platform of right we stand, as the basis of popular govern-
ment in Rhode Island. The same Bill of Rights, with some modifications,
was subsequently enacted by the Legislature and is found in the Digest of
Laws of 1798. And a higher power than the Legislature had declared that
not one of these rights could be abridged or violated, and that no body of
men could deprive or divest their posterity of either of them.
Still the people of Rhode Island were without a written constitution,
and so remained for more than half a century after this declaration.
Id. at 16-17. The reference in this passage to the Digest of Laws of 1798 is curious.
The parts of the Declaration of Rights that were codified in 1798 did not relate to
popular sovereignty, which was Hallett's reason for citing the Declaration of
Rights.
6. The terms higher law and higher lawmaking in this article follow Profes-
sor Ackerman's theory of a dualist democracy whereby the process of lawmaking
at the federal level is separated into two separate tracks. Higher law, in this view,
is fundamental law that is created and approved by the sovereign people. Normal
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and ratified by a convention of the people.7 Under the principles of
popular sovereignty articulated during that period by the Rhode
Island legislature, the delegates selected for the constitutional con-
vention of 1790 had the power to produce constitutional law.
Although this Declaration of Rights was not a complete constitu-
tion outlining the structure of government, it was written constitu-
law, in his parlance, corresponds to statutes enacted by legislatures that govern
the affairs of the state. In this conceptual scheme, the legislature does not have
the authority to alter higher law. In this article, Ackerman's dualist democracy
construct is applied to the process of creating higher law and normal law in the
State of Rhode Island. See Bruce Ackerman, We The People (1991).
Since the 1770s, higher lawmaking at the state level through the United
States has generally been through mechanisms such as the people acting in con-
vention or acting by referendum. These mechanisms for creating higher law are
normally sponsored or supported by the legislative and executive branches of state
government. In addition, the state legislature normally approves the action of the
sovereign people ex poste.
A considerable literature has developed recently on alternative mechanisms
for higher lawmaking at the federal level. For example, Ackerman asserts that
alternative mechanisms of higher lawmaking were responsible for the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments and the New Deal Court's 'Switch in Time'. Id. at 42-43, 58.
For an illuminating study of possible alternative mechanisms for adopting higher
law, see Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988).
7. This conclusion is based on the application of the principles of popular
sovereignty to Rhode Island's 1790 constitutional convention. Under principles of
popular sovereignty, the people are the source of the government's power and
therefore have the right to alter or abolish the government. A common mechanism
for the exercise of this right in the American states in the 1770s and 1780s was for
representatives chosen by the people to meet in convention for the purpose of
drafting and ratifying constitutional law. For a clear statement of the theory and
application of popular sovereignty in the United States in the 1770s and 1780s, see
1 R. R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution, 213-35 (1959-64). Palmer
wrote,
[t]he constitutional convention in theory embodied the sovereignty of the
people. The people chose it for a specific purpose, not to govern, but to set
up institutions of government. The convention, acting as the sovereign
people, proceeded to draft a constitution and a declaration of rights. Cer-
tain natural or inalienable rights of the citizen were thus laid down at the
same time as the powers of government. It was the constitution that cre-
ated the powers of government, defined their scope, gave them legality,
and balanced them one against another. The constitution was written
and comprised in a single document. The constitution and accompanying
declaration, drafted by the convention, must, in the developed theory, be
ratified by the people...
Id; see also Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (1969) (providing
a detailed study of the development of the theory of popular sovereignty and state
constitutional development between 1776 and 1787).
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tional law which could only be repealed or revised by a subsequent
act of higher lawmaking by the people.
In order to prove the constitutional status of the Declaration of
Rights, this article will trace the history of the document from its
formation to its ratification. If the Declaration of Rights was valid
constitutional law, it is important to explore the extent to which
subsequent constitutions adopted by the people of Rhode Island
have nullified or revised this document. The article concludes that
Rhode Island's subsequent constitutional history has not resulted
in the repeal of the Declaration and leads to the conclusion that
some sections of the 1790 bill of rights may be enforceable today.
2. RHODE ISLAND HISTORY BEFORE 1790
Before examining the Rhode Island Convention of 1790, it is
important to review the constitutional history of Rhode Island
prior to its adoption of the U.S. Constitution.
A. The Charter
From 1643 to 1842, Rhode Island was governed by two written
charters. Rhode Island and Connecticut were the only states not
governed by a state constitution by 1789. Indeed, Rhode Island's
second charter granted in 1663, survived three periods of wide-
spread higher lawmaking during which new constitutions were
adopted in state constitutional conventions across the nation in the
early days of the republic.8
The charters were not a grant of power to govern originating
from the people. Although the people played a role in the design of
the charters, the British Sovereign was the source of the charters
and granted certain rights to the people of the colony. The first
charter, obtained in 1643, was a parliamentary patent.9 It pro-
vided "full Power and Authority to rule themselves, and such
others as shall hereafter inhabit within . . . said tract of land, by
such a Form of Civil Government... they shall find most suitable
8. These periods were: 1777-1787, 1815-1820, 1830-1840. Connecticut re-
placed its charter with a state constitution in 1818. See 1 F.N. Thorpe, Federal
and State Constitutions at 536 (1993).
9. Conley, supra note 5 at 17-18. Conley notes that Parliament was the
source of the 1643 Charter, because the King, Charles I, had already begun to lose
power. Charles I was ultimately executed in 1649 following the English Civil War.
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to their Estate and Condition; ... "10 Following the restoration of
the monarchy in 1660, the 1643 charter was replaced by a royal
charter granted by Charles II in 1663. The charters established
Rhode Island as a corporate colony. As a corporate colony, the resi-
dents of Rhode Island were granted virtual self governance."
Indeed, the 1663 Charter (Charter) allowed the colonists to es-
tablish whatever structure of government was best suited to their
needs. These rights of self-governance, however, did not include
the right or power to amend the Charter. Rather, the Charter per-
mitted the freemen of Rhode Island to design and revise a form of
government as long as such government was in accordance with
the Charter. The amendment power rested solely with the British
Sovereign, the source of the Charter.
B. The Revolutionary Era
Rhode Island's Charter remained in force throughout the
colonial period.12 Violations of several Charter provisions were
not infrequent 13 but the Charter itself was not altered or
abandoned. 14 On May 4, 1776, the General Assembly of Rhode Is-
land declared the colony's independence by ending allegiance to
the King and establishing government authority in the "Governor
and Company of the English Colony of Rhode Island and Provi-
dence Plantations."15 On July 18, 1776, the General Assembly
ended its colonial status in a resolution approving the Declaration
of Independence of July 4, 1776.16
10. Thorpe, supra note 8 at 3210.
11. Conley, supra note 5 at 22-23, especially n.4.
12. See generally, id., for a comprehensive history of the charter governments
during the colonial period. Conley's book is the definitive work on Rhode Island
constitutional history from 1776 to 1841. It also includes a valuable and very read-
able history of the charters between 1643 and 1776.
13. Conley cites the exclusion of Catholics from being freemen between 1719-
1783, id. at 33-35 and the occasional use of primogeniture before 1770, id. at 24,
n.6 as examples.
14. The possible exception to the continued operation of the Charter involved
the consolidation of New England government under the Dominion of New Eng-
land in the 1680s. Massachusetts lost its corporate charter at that time, but Con-
necticut and Rhode Island were able to preserve their charters. According to
Conley, Rhode Island claimed that it did not surrender its charter when it submit-
ted to the consolidation. Id. at 27.
15. 7 Bartlet, Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Planta-
tions in New England, 522-26 (1968); see also
16. Id. at 581-82.
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This was, in effect, an act of higher lawmaking by the legisla-
ture. There was no referendum, no convention and no special elec-
tion by the freemen before this action was undertaken. It was not
an act of the people. The General Assembly, on its own authority,
altered the source of sovereign power in the Charter. The General
Assembly, however, did not alter the substantive provisions of the
Charter relating to the structure or operation of the state
government.
In September, 1777, the General Assembly created a commit-
tee to draft a plan of government, but there is no record of any
committee report. 17 The failure of the state to draft a new consti-
tution may be related to the extent of British occupation during the
war. One-third of the state, including Newport, was occupied dur-
ing most of the Revolutionary War.' 8 There also may not have
been the same urgency to adopt a new form of government in
Rhode Island or in Connecticut, the other corporate colony, as
there was in other states. Prior to independence, the two corporate
colonies had the most autonomous political institutions and polit-
ical life of the thirteen colonies.' 9
The act of higher lawmaking undertaken by the General As-
sembly in declaring independence and changing the source of au-
thority in the Charter was repeated when it came time to ratify the
Articles of Confederation. Here again, the Assembly ratified the
Articles without a convention or direct referral to the people. 20
The General Assembly acted very quickly in accepting the Arti-
cles.21 Although the legislators may have discussed the Articles of
Confederation in town meetings, historians have not noted any dis-
This Assembly, taking into the most serious consideration, the resolutions
of the Most Honorable the Continental Congress of the United States of
America, of the 4th instant, declaring the said states free and independ-
ent states, do approve the said resolution; and do most solemnly engage,
that we will support the said General Congress, with our lives and for-
tunes . . . Be it enacted by this General Assembly, and by the authority
thereof, it is enacted, that for the future, the style and title of this govern-
ment, in all acts and instruments, whether of a public or private nature,
shall be the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations; ....
17. Conley, supra note 5, at 67.
18. Irwin Polishook, Rhode Island and the Union 1774-1795, 13 (1969).
19. Conley, supra note 5 at 24.
20. Richard Morris, Forging of the Union 316-317 (1987).
21. The state legislature received the Articles of Confederation on December
19, 1777 and ratified them on February 18, 1778. William Staples, Rhode Island in
the Continental Congress 1765-1790, pp. 133-137 (1971).
38 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:31
cussions at town meetings nor mentioned any instructions given to
representatives.
By 1787, the government of Rhode Island had begun to articu-
late the principle of popular sovereignty as the basis for govern-
mental authority. In a letter to the President of Congress dated
September 15, 1787, the Governor of Rhode Island attempted to
justify Rhode Island's absence from the Philadelphia Convention
by stating that the legislature could not appoint delegates to the
late convention because "as that delegation in convention is for the
express purpose of altering a constitution . the people at large
are only capable of appointing the members."22 Several members
of the General Assembly from Newport and Providence objected to
the letter and its rationale. 23 Putting aside the specific issue of
appointing delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, the Gover-
nor's letter indicates that popular sovereignty was by then thought
to be the basis for the authority of the state government and, ac-
cordingly, that altering constitutional law would have to be an act
of the people.
The General Assembly also stated that the people are the
source of the government's authority in rejecting the Congress' re-
quest that the proposed federal constitution be considered by a
convention, convened for that purpose, in each state.24 Instead of
calling a convention, the General Assembly placed the constitution
before the people in a referendum. Rhode Island was the only state
which did not honor this request made by the Congress. 25
22. Bartlett, supra note 15 at 258-59. Rhode Island was the only state not to
send any delegates to the Philadelphia Convention. Although this refusal to par-
ticipate is often used as evidence of the state's rogue character in the 1780s, it is
little disputed that the Philadelphia Convention was not legally empowered to pro-
pose a new constitution nor was Article VII's ratification provision in accordance
with the legal requirements for amending the Articles of Confederation. For differ-
ent views on the authority of the federal convention, see Bruce Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L. J. 1013, 1017 (1984), and
Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article
V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev.1043, 1047-1049 (1988). The governor's language suggests
that dualist democracy principles were in place at that time.
23. Bartlett, supra note 15 at 259-60.
24. Congress sent the Constitution to the states in a resolution passed on Sep-
tember 28, 1787. It should also be noted that the Congress' decision to have the
new constitution considered by conventions rather than by the state legislatures
was at variance with the requirements for amending the Articles of Confederation.
25. The General Assembly's explanation was as follows:
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After the Constitution was defeated in the referendum, 26 the
General Assembly denied eleven motions for a state convention
before allowing a convention to take place. 27 The General Assem-
bly's decision, on January 17, 1790, to finally permit a convention
to be assembled to deliberate on the U.S. constitution was clearly
the product of the increasing pressure being applied to Rhode Is-
land by the new government of the United States.28
This legislative body, in General Assembly convened, conceiving them-
selves representatives of the great body of the people at large, . .. cannot
make any innovation in a Constitution which has been agreed upon, and
the compact settled between the governors and the governed, without the
express consent of the freemen at large, by their own voices individually
taken in town meetings assembled.
This explanation was given in an act passed by the General Assembly in February
1788. Bartlett, supra note 15 at 271-2.
26. The Constitution was defeated in the March 1788 referendum by a lop-
sided vote of 2,708 to 237. Bartlett, supra note 15 at 275. The incredible margin of
defeat was the result of widespread abstentions by those favoring the constitution,
in protest against the state legislature's refusal to call a special convention. Con-
ley, supra note 5 at 110.
27. According to Conley, historians differ as to the exact number of times the
legislature denied motions to call a convention. He cites a list of eleven rejections
noted in an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Irwin Polishook, Rhode Island
and the Union, 1774-1790: A Study in State History During the Confederation Era
280 (1961) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University). Conley,
supra note 5 at 109-110. Other historians, for example Robert Cotner, noted seven
such rejections. Robert C. Cotner, Theodore Foster's Minutes of the Convention 13
(1929).
28. The U.S. government began operating in early 1789. "On Wednesday the
4th of March, 1789, proceedings commenced under the Constitution; and on the
30th of April, of the same year, George Washington, elected by the unanimous
suffrage of the electors, was inaugurated as President of the United States." 1
Elliot's Debates 333 (1866). By January, 1790, Rhode Island was the only state not
to ratify the Constitution. North Carolina, the twelfth state to ratify, approved the
U.S. Constitution in convention on November 21, 1789. Id. During 1789, Congres-
sional legislation was passed that would require Rhode Island to be treated as a
foreign nation if the state did not ratify the Constitution in the near future. Con-
ley, supra note 5 at 134-138. According to Conley, "The principle proximate cause
for Rhode Island ratification was economic coercion exerted upon the state by the
new federal government." Id. at 134. The impact of Congressional pressure is
clearly illustrated by a September, 1789 letter from the General Assembly to the
President and Congress of the "eleven United States of America" pleading for Con-
gressional patience with Rhode Island, despite its failure to ratify the Constitution
or call a ratifying convention. Bartlett, supra note 15 at 356-57.
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3. THE FIRST CONVENTION
Pursuant to the resolution passed by the General Assembly on
January 17, 1790, town meetings were held to elect delegates to
the convention on February 8, 1790.29 During February, delegates
received instructions from town meetings regarding whether to
ratify the Constitution." ° The Convention convened on March 1,
1790, with approximately forty anti-Federalists out of seventy
delegates.31
Late in the afternoon on Tuesday, March 2 or early on
Wednesday,32 one of the Smithfield delegates, John Sayles, 33
moved for the creation of a committee to frame a bill of rights and
amendments to the Constitution. The motion was not passed at
that time. Wednesday was spent reviewing the U.S. Constitution,
article by article. 34 The convention proceeded with its analysis of
the Constitution and then considered the twelve amendments pro-
posed by the Congress in March, 1789. Next, the amendments pro-
posed by New York, North Carolina, Massachusetts and Virginia,
upon their accessions to the union, were read to the convention.
Finally, the convention agreed to appoint a committee to draft a
bill of rights and a series of amendments.3 5
The committee included two delegates from each of the five
counties and was comprised primarily of delegates opposed to the
Constitution.36 After deliberating from Thursday afternoon to Fri-
29. Bartlett, supra note 15 at 373.
30. Two examples of these instructions are reproduced in Staples, supra note
21 at 635-37. The Town of Richmond instructed its delegates not to adopt the
Constitution at this time, and to explore necessary amendments. In contrast, the
Town of Portsmouth instructed its delegates to support ratification, to fight any
adjournment past April 1, and to consider possible amendments. Id.
31. Cotner, supra note 27 at 20.
32. According to Theodore Foster's unofficial minutes of the convention, it was
Tuesday afternoon. Cotner, supra note 27 at 38. Daniel Updike was the Secretary
of the convention. According to his official journal of the convention, it was
Wednesday morning. Staples, supra note 21 at 643. Updike's journal is repro-
duced in its entirety in Staples, supra note 21.
33. According to Cotner, Sayles "voted against the Constitution every time he
had an opportunity." Cotner, supra note 27 at 34.
34. Article I, Section 8, was the most widely debated because of the issue of
slavery. Cotner, supra note 27 at 47-54.
35. Cotner, supra note 27 at 58-60.
36. George Champlin, a Federalist delegate from Newport, proposed that the
Committee consist of anti-Federalists. Cotner speculated that Champlin, "Realiz-
ing that the Federalists were outnumbered... probably hoped that by getting all
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day afternoon, the drafting committee reported a bill of rights and
series of additional amendments to be proposed to the U.S. Con-
gress. There is apparently no record of the committee's delibera-
tions. While the provisions of the Committee's draft Declaration of
Rights were taken almost verbatim from the resolutions passed by
the Virginia convention when that state ratified the U.S. Constitu-
tion,3 7 a careful comparison of the two texts reveals some interest-
ing differences.38 The Virginia resolutions read as follows:
That there be a declaration or bill of rights asserting, and se-
curing from encroachment, the essential and unalienable
rights of the people, in some such manner as the following:
1st. That there are certain natural rights, of which
men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or
divest their posterity; among which are the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and pro-
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.
2d. That all power is naturally invested in, and conse-
quently derived from the people; that magistrates therefore
are their trustees and agents, at all times amenable to them.
3d. That government ought to be instituted for the com-
mon benefit, protection, and security of the people; and that
the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and
oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and
happiness of mankind.
4th. That no man or set of men are entitled to separate
or exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the com-
munity, but in consideration of public services, which not be-
ing descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate,
legislator, or judge, or any other public office, to be
hereditary.
5th. That legislative, executive, and judicial powers of
government should be separate and distinct; and, that the
the objections in writing, the Federalists could force a vote to adopt the Constitu-
tion with the suggested amendments." Id. at 60.
37. See 3 Elliot's Debates at 657-59 (1878); see also 5 The Founders' Constitu-
tion, 15-17 (1987).
38. The most interesting difference was the addition of Section III, especially
its reference to popular sovereignty. There were also partial differences in word-
ings in Sections XI, XII, XIV, XV and XVII. For example, in Sections XIV and XV,
the Rhode Island convention substituted "person" for "freeman." The order of the
sections is also different. For example, the religion clause was sixteenth in the
Virginia Convention, but fourth in the Rhode Island Declaration.
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members of the two first may be restrained from oppression
by feeling and participating the public burdens, they should,
at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into
the mass of the people, and the vacancies be supplied by cer-
tain and regular elections, in which all or any part of the for-
mer members to be eligible or ineligible, as the rules of the
Constitution of government, and the laws, shall direct.
6th. That the elections of representatives in the legisla-
ture ought to be free and frequent, and all men having suffi-
cient evidence of permanent common interest with, and
attachment to, the community, ought to have the right of suf-
frage; and no aid, charge, tax, or fee, can be set, rated, or lev-
ied, upon the people without their own consent, or that of
their representatives, so elected; nor can they be bound by
any law to which they have not, in like manner, assented, for
the public good.
7th. That all power of suspending laws, or the execution
of laws, by any authority, without the consent of the repre-
sentatives of the people in the legislature, is injurious to their
rights, and ought not be exercised.
8th. That, in all criminal and capital prosecutions, a
man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accu-
sation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to
call for evidence, and be allowed counsel in his favor, and to a
fair and speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage,
without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty,
(except in the government of the land and naval forces;) nor
can he be compelled to give evidence against himself.
9th. That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties, privileges, or franchises, or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived
of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.
10th. That every freeman restrained of his liberty is en-
titled to a remedy, to inquire into the lawfulness thereof, and
to remove the same, if unlawful, and that such remedy ought
not to be denied nor delayed.
lth. That, in controversies respecting property, and in
suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is one of
the greatest securities to the rights of the people, and to re-
main sacred and inviolable.
12th. That every freeman ought to find a certain rem-
edy, by recourse to the laws, for all injuries and wrongs he
may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to
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obtain right and justice freely, without sale, completely and
without denial, promptly and without delay; and that all es-
tablishments or regulations contravening these rights are op-
pressive and unjust.
13th. That excessive bail ought not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
14th. That every freeman has a right to be secure from
all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his pa-
pers, and property; all warrants, therefore, to search sus-
pected places, or seize any freeman, his papers, or property,
without information on oath (or affirmation of a person relig-
iously scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient
cause, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants
to search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected
person, without specially naming or describing the place or
person, are dangerous, and ought not to be granted.
15th. That the people have a right peaceably to assem-
ble together to consult for the common good, or to instruct
their representatives; and that every freeman has a right to
petition or apply to the legislature for redress of grievances.
16th. That the people have a right to freedom of speech,
and of writing and publishing their sentiments; that the free-
dom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty,
and ought not to be violated.
17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear
arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of
the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe
defence of a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace,
are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided,
as far as the circumstances and protection of the community
will admit; and that, in all cases, the military should be under
strict subordination to, and governed by the civil power.
18th. That no soldier in time of peace ought to be quar-
tered in any house without the consent of the owner, and in
time of war in such manner only as the law directs.
19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing
arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to
employ another to bear arms in his stead.
20th. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our
Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed
only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and
therefore all men have an equal, natural, and alienable right
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to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society
ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to
others.
Virginia's declaration of rights was clearly intended to be sugges-
tions for civil rights-type amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 39
At the time of Virginia's ratification, the Congress had not yet ap-
proved the twelve amendments sent to the states for ratification in
March, 1789. Moreover, Virginia already had a Declaration of
Rights accompanying its state constitution. 40
The Preamble to the Rhode Island drafting committee's report
evidenced a significantly different purpose:
We, the subscribers, being the committee appointed to report
amendments necessary to the proposed Constitution of the
United States of America, do report: That, previous to the
adoption of the Federal Constitution, there be a Declaration,
or Bill of Rights, asserting and securing from encroachments
the essential and inalienable rights of the people of this state.
[emphasis added]
The Committee reported the following Declaration of Rights:
1. That there are certain natural rights, of which men,
when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest
their posterity, - among which are the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing and protect-
ing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.
2. That all power is naturally vested in and conse-
quently derived from the people: That magistrates, therefore,
are their trustees and agents, and at all times amenable to
them.
3. That the powers of government may be reassumed
by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary to their
happiness: -That the rights of the States respectively to
nominate and appoint all State officers, and every other
39. The Virginia convention also proposed a separate list of amendments to
the structure of government proposed in Articles I-III of the U.S. Constitution.
40. Virginia had adopted a Declaration of Rights on June 12, 1776. Soon af-
ter, the state adopted a constitution providing for the structures of state govern-
ment. The 1776 Constitution did not include another statement of rights. The
June declaration was higher law that was somehow incorporated into the state
constitution. For a copy of the Declaration of June 12, 1776, see 5 The Founders'
Constitution, 3-4 (1987).
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power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said Consti-
tution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States,
or to the departments of government thereof, remain to the
people of the several States, or their respective State govern-
ments, to whom they may have granted the same; -and that
those clauses in the said Constitution which declare that
Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not im-
ply, that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the
said Constitution; - but such clauses are to be construed, as
exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely
for greater caution.
4. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Crea-
tor, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by
reason and conviction, not by force or violence-and therefore
all men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the
free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of con-
science; -and that no particular religious sect, or society,
ought to be favoured or established by law, in preference to
others.
5. That the legislative, executive and judiciary powers
of government, should be separate and distinct; -and that
the members of the two first may be restrained from oppres-
sion, by feeling and participating the public burdens, they
should at fixed periods be reduced to a private station, return
into the mass of the people, and the vacancies be supplied by
certain and regular elections-in which all or any part of the
vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elections, in
which all or any part of the former members to be eligible or
ineligible, as the rules of the Constitution of government and
the laws shall direct.
6. That elections of Representatives in Legislature
ought to be free and frequent-and all men, having sufficient
evidence of permanent common interest with and attachment
to the community, ought to have the right of suffrage: And no
aid, charge, tax or fee, can be set, rated or levied upon the
people, without their own consent, or that of their Represent-
atives, so elected; -nor can they be bound by any law, to
which they have not, in like manner, assented for the public
good.
7. That all power of suspending laws, or the execution
of laws, by any authority, without the consent of the Repre-
sentatives of the people in the Legislature, is injurious to
their rights, and ought not be exercised.
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8. That in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man
hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusa-
tion-to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses-to
call for evidence, and be allowed counsel in his favour-and
to a fair and speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage,
without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty
(except in the government of the land and naval forces) nor
can he be compelled to give evidence against himself.
9. That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties, privileges or franchises,
our outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or de-
prived of his life, liberty or property, but by the trial by jury,
or by the law of the land.
10. That every freeman restrained of his liberty is enti-
tled to a remedy, to enquire into the lawfulness thereof, and
to remove the same, if unlawful; -and that such remedy
ought not to be denied or delayed.
11. That in controversies respecting property, and in
suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury, as hath
been exercised by us and our ancestors, from the time
whereof the memory of man is not to the contrary, is one of
the greatest securities to the rights of the people, and ought
to remain sacred and inviolate.
12. That every freeman ought to obtain right and jus-
tice freely, and without sale-completely, and without denial,
-promptly, and without delay-and that all establishments
or regulations, contravening these rights, are oppressive and
unjust.
13. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments
inflicted.
14. That every person has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers,
or his property; -and therefore that all warrants to search
suspected places, or seize any person, his papers, or his prop-
erty, without information upon oath, or affirmation of suffi-
cient cause, are grievous and oppressive; -and that all
general warrants (or such in which the place or person sus-
pected are not particularly designated) are dangerous, and
ought not to be granted.
15. That the people have a right peacably to assemble
together, to consult for their common good, or to instruct their
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Representatives; -and that every person has a right to peti-
tion, or apply to the Legislature, for redress of grievances.
16. That the people have a right to freedom of speech,
and of writing and publishing their sentiments: -That free-
dom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty,
and ought not be violated.
17. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms:
-That a well-regulated militia, including the body of the peo-
ple capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural, and safe
defence of a free State: -that the militia shall not be subject
to martial law, except in time of war, rebellion, or insurrec-
tion: -That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous
to liberty, and ought not to be kept up, except in cases of ne-
cessity; -and that at all times the military should be under
strict subordination to the civil power: -That in time of
peace no soldier ought to be quartered in any house without
the consent of the owner-and in time of war, only by the
civil magistrate, in such manner as the law directs.
18. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing
arms, ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent
to employ another to bear arms in his stead.41
From the language of the Preamble it is clear the proposed bill
of rights was meant to assert and secure the rights of Rhode Is-
landers. It was not intended to be a series of amendments to the
United States Constitution, but rather to be a Rhode Island Bill of
Rights. Indeed, there was no need for the convention to propose a
declaration of rights for the U.S. Constitution because the Rhode
Island convention already had the first twelve amendments pro-
posed by Congress before it for deliberation. Furthermore, the
Declaration of Rights included provisions that were parallel to
most of the rights enumerated in the proposed amendments that
constitute the U.S. Bill of Rights.
Charged with reviewing and voting on the U.S. Constitution,
the convention had to confront the most fundamental issue of polit-
ical life in their day-the power of the people in relation to their
government. Because the protection of the fundamental rights of
the people in a federal system of government requires that the lim-
its on the authority of the state government as well as the limits on
41. Patrick Conley, First in War Last in Peace, Rhode Island and the Consti-
tution, 1786-1790 26 (1987). Staples, supra note 21 at 650-53; 1 Elliot's Debates
334-335 (1878).
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the authority of the national government be established, the con-
vention delegates considered not only the powers to be granted by
the people to the national government, but also the powers of
granted to the state government. In Rhode Island, however, unlike
Virginia and most of the other states, there had never been a state
constitutional convention that had created a state bill of rights de-
lineating the limits on state government power.42 Because it was
essential for the delegates to articulate the rights of the people in
relation to the state, the convention delegates drafted a Declara-
tiono of Rights that focused on the limits of the power of the state
government. 43 Having drafted this statement of the rights of the
people of the state, the convention delegates submitted it to the
people of Rhode Island for their approval and later linked their rat-
ification of the federal constitution to its adherence to the princi-
ples in the Declaration of Rights. Indeed, the Bill of Ratification
later adopted by the convention indicates that the ratification of
the U.S. Constitution may have been a conditional ratification, i.e.,
that the people of Rhode Island only approved the U.S. Constitu-
tion to the extent that it was "consistent" with the Declaration of
Rights .44
On Saturday, March 6, 1790, the convention voted to refer the
amendments and the Declaration of Rights to "the freemen of the
several towns."45 The convention then agreed to adjourn until late
May, well beyond the threatened deadlines for Congressional ac-
tion to exclude Rhode Island from the union. The decision to ad-
42. This convention was the first convention of the people of the State of
Rhode Island. See infra, note 60.
43. Because this state bill of rights was drafted during the constitutional con-
vention held to consider the federal constitution, it does contain one section (sec-
tion 3) that makes explicit references to the federal government and the U.S.
Constitution.
44. See infra, n.54.
45. Staples, supra note 21 at 656. The resolution read in part, "VOTED, That
'the Bill of Rights' and 'Amendments' proposed to the Federal Constitution, be re-
ferred to the freemen of the several towns, at their town meetings .. . for their
consideration. . . ." The report in the Providence Gazette of March 13, included the
following statement:
Gov. Bradford then proposed that the adjournment should be to the last
Monday in March. In favor of this motion, it was observed, that the ad-
journment proposed would afford sufficient time to lay the Bill of Rights
and the amendments before the people for their consideration, and that
this had been the ostensible object of the gentlemen who had voted for an
adjournment....
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journ, however, was better than defeat for supporters of the
Constitution. Indeed, they had entered the convention with a ten
vote deficit. The anti-Federalists probably voted to adjourn be-
cause they feared that the Constitution might be ratified with the
proposed amendments and the Declaration of Rights.46 The ten
vote gap apparently had receded during the deliberations.
4. THE SECOND CONVENTION
During late May 1790, the delegates assembled again, this
time in Newport. Between the first and second session of the con-
vention, the people of the towns had met to discuss the Constitu-
tion, the Declaration of Rights and the proposed amendments.
Many of the towns provided instructions for their delegates. Four
of the six written instructions known to exist specifically mention
the Bill of Rights. 47 Only one of the four instructions, that of Mid-
46. Cotner, supra note 27 at 21.
47. The six written instructions are reproduced in Staples, supra note 21 at
663-66. The instructions from the town of Richmond, state in part,
In Town meeting, 15th April, A.D. 1790. Upon the Bill of Rights and
amendments, proposed by the Convention of the State of Rhode Island, &
c., to the Constitution of the United States:
IT IS VOTED AND RESOLVED, That the same, hereby, are ap-
proved by this meeting, and that the delegates appointed by this town be,
and they hereby are, instructed to use their influence, in said Convention,
at their adjournment, that the following amendments be added to said
amendments: ....
In Midddletown, the instructions included the following,
VOTED, That this meeting do approve of the Bill of Rights and
amendments, submitted by the late Convention; and that the delegates of
this town are hereby instructed to use their votes and influence for adopt-
ing the Constitution of the United States, if the said Bill of Rights and the
said amendments first become a part of said Constitution, together with
the following additional amendment ....
In Charlestown, the instructions included the following,
At a town meeting held in Charlestown, in Washington County, on
the 21st day of April, 1790:
VOTED, That the Bill of Rights, framed by the State Convention, be
approved by this town meeting.
VOTED, That this town meeting do approve of the amendments made
by this State Convention, to the new Constitution.
VOTED, That the delegates from this town, do not adopt the Consti-
tution of the United States, until the amendments proposed by our State
Convention, shall become a part of said Constitution.
In North Kingstown, the instructions included the following,
Instructions for the delegates of the town of North Kingstown, when
in convention assembled, on the 24th day of May, A.D. 1790, respecting
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dletown, refers to the Bill of Rights as becoming part of the Federal
Constitution.48
The second session of the Convention assembled on Tuesday,
May 25, 1790. The following day, the drafting committee was re-
quested to propose further amendments to the Constitution "as
they shall think expedient, agreeably to the instructions from the
several towns, and that they report."49 On Thursday morning, the
committee reported its findings and then proceeded to consider a
variety of amendments. On Friday afternoon, a motion of adjourn-
ment until Saturday at 3:00 p.m. was passed, to allow certain dele-
gates to receive instructions from their towns before voting on
ratification. 50
On Saturday, May 29, at 5:20 p.m., the bill of ratification was
accepted by the convention by a vote of thirty-four delegates to
thirty-two delegates. 51 The Ratification began as follows:
the Bill of Rights and amendments, recommended to the consideration of
the freemen of this town:
VOTED, That the amendments proposed... are conceived, by the
freemen of this town, inadequate to real and substantial amendments...
and that they do not adopt the Constitution, until their proceedings be
again laid before and conceded to by the freemen of this State, and the
amendments made by said Convention be agree to by the Congress of the
United States....
48. It is impossible to determine whether the people of Middletown viewed the
convention's draft Bill of Rights as intended to be a series of amendments to the
Constitution, or whether their instructions reflected a desire for approval of a Bill
of Rights together with the Constitution. The latter seems more plausible since
there were twelve amendments before the states for ratification at that time, ten
of which became the federal "Bill of Rights." It should also be noted that Mid-
dletown was the only one of the four towns that mentioned the Bill of Rights whose
delegates voted for ratification. See Staples, supra note 21 at 672-73, for the final
vote of the convention, ratifying the Constitution.
49. Id. at 668.
50. Id. at 668-69.
51. It should be noted that the U.S. Constitution was ratified in Rhode Island
by delegates representing a minority of the voters. Indeed, the delegates voting for
ratification represented only 44.1% of the population, while those voting against
represented 51.4%. Roll, Jr., Charles W., We, Some of the People: Apportionment
in the Thirteen State Conventions Ratifying the Constitution, The Journal of Amer-
ican History, 26 Vol. LV1, (June, 1969). It is likely, however, that many of those
who voted against ratification were happier with the new state bill of rights than
with the U.S. Constitution because the drafting committee had been comprised
mainly of opponents to the Constitution. Furthermore, many delegates in Rhode
Island and other states had refused to affirm the Constitution largely because
there was no bill of rights contained in it. Opposition to the Rhode Island Bill of
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BY THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS.
We, the delegates of the people of the State of Rhode Island
and Providence Plantations, duly elected and met in Conven-
tion, having maturely considered the Constitution of the
United States of America .... and having also seriously and
deliberately considered the present situation of this State, do
declare and make known: .... 52
The Declaration of Rights, composed of eighteen articles, immedi-
ately followed the preface. After the Declaration of Rights, the Bill
of Ratification stated, in part,
Under these impressions and declaring that the rights afore-
said cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explana-
tions aforesaid are consistent with the said Constitution, and
in confidence that the amendments hereinafter mentioned will
receive an early and mature consideration... we, the said
delegates... do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the
said Constitution. .. "3
The preface to the Declaration of Rights, the Declaration of Rights
and the above paragraph, constituted the Bill of Ratification. The
bill itself was followed by a second statement, consisting of the
twenty-one proposed amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Before
adjourning sine die, the convention also recommended that the leg-
islature adopt eleven of the twelve amendments proposed by the
Congress.54
A Preliminary Conclusion
This account of the ratifying convention establishes that the
Declaration of Rights and the proposed amendments to the U.S.
Constitution were contained in separate documents addressing dif-
ferent concerns. The paragraph following the Declaration of
Rights clearly indicates that the Declaration was not intended to
merely be a proposal for additional amendments to the Federal
Rights, then, was probably rather limited. Indeed, I have found no secondary ref-
erences to substantial debate about its provisions.
52. Staples, supra note 21 at 674. The text of the Bill of Ratification, includ-
ing the Declaration of Rights and the proposed amendments can also be found in 1
Elliot's Debates, 334-37 (1878).
53. Staples, supra note 21 at 677 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 674. On June 7, 1790, the General Assembly of the State of Rhode
Island ratified eleven of the twelve amendments that had been proposed by the
U.S. Congress in March, 1789. Bartlett, supra note 15 at 381-82.
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Constitution. Rather, the paragraph shows that the Declaration of
Rights as enacted by the people in convention was to take effect re-
gardless of whether any other amendments were subsequently
adopted. Further, the Bill of Ratification explicitly stated that the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution was subject to the inviolability
of the rights in the Declaration. The language of the bill suggests
that these principles were not viewed as amendments, but rather
as limitations on the grant of sovereignty to the federal govern-
ment and by implication to the assembly itself.55
By 1790, the governor and general assembly of Rhode Island
had repeatedly asserted to the U.S. Congress that their power was
derived from the people. The Declaration of Rights was proposed
by a convention of the people that had been initially convened with
the consent of the legislature, and then was submitted directly to
the people for consideration in town meetings. On May 29, 1790,
the Declaration of Rights was approved by the representatives of
the people in the second convention. Because it was proposed by a
convention of the people, submitted to the people, and then ratified
by that convention, it became higher law (i.e., constitutional law)
in the State of Rhode Island under the principles of popular sover-
eignty operating in the state at that time.56
55. Whether the State of Rhode Island could have later withdrawn its grant of
sovereignty to the U.S. government based on a breach of its conditional grant of
sovereignty was indirectly resolved by the U.S. government's victory in the War
between the States in 1865.
56. It could be argued that the bill of rights was not valid because the conven-
tion was not authorized by the legislature to write a state "constitutional" docu-
ment and because it was never valorized as higher law by the state government.
This argument raises the major conceptual issue regarding popular sovereignty
faced by the Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1894).
If the legislature neither authorized nor valorized the Declaration of Rights, it
may be viewed as of doubtful validity as higher law. If higher lawmaking requires
the consent or approval of the existing government, the Bill of Rights may not be a
constitutional document yet (the legislature or Supreme Court of Rhode Island
could still valorize it). However, by accepting the Bill of Ratification from the con-
vention, the General Assembly may have valorized the Declaration of Rights. If
higher lawmaking only requires the approval of the people, the Bill of Rights is
valid because voted on by the people in town meetings before its ratification. The
fate of this document, then, may rest on the same rocky ground as the "People's
Constitution" of 1842, except that the Bill of Rights could now be recognized.
The recent ratification of the 27th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is a
powerful precedent for certification of a constitutional law provision after a very
lengthy period of gestation. The 27th Amendment, which states that no Congres-
sional pay raise may take effect until after an intervening election, was originally
proposed by Congress in 1789. Pursuant to Article V of the U.S. Constitution, it
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The Declaration of Rights was not intended as a series of con-
stitutional amendments to the U.S. Constitution, but rather as an
exposition of the fundamental "constitutional" rights of the people
of Rhode Island. The Declaration of Rights was distinct from the
proposed amendments. The fact that the Congressional amend-
ments which became known as the U.S. "Bill of Rights" were also
considered separately by the convention lends further support to
this idea. The Declaration of Rights, therefore, should be viewed
as written higher law, aimed at preserving the fundamental rights
of Rhode Islanders. Indeed, the passage of such a Declaration of
Rights as Rhode Island law was also very significant for the people
was sent to the states for approval together with eleven other amendments, ten of
which were approved in 1792 (and are commonly known as the U.S. Bill of Rights).
On May 7, 1992, Michigan became the thirty-eighth state to ratify the Congres-
sional pay amendment, satisfying the requirement in Article V that an amend-
ment proposed by the Congress be approved by legislatures of three-quarters of the
states. Michael Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons
of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 678 (1993).
Because the period between proposal and ratification was 202 years, it was
uncertain whether Michigan's ratification would result in the actual amendment of
the Constitution. Soon after Michigan's action, the National Archivist, an execu-
tive branch official, certified the amendment as valid. Both houses of the U.S. Con-
gress then voted to endorse the amendment's certification as part of the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 678-682.
The Declaration of Rights presents a different factual question because it is
the certification, if necessary, that has been delayed for 206 years, not the ratifica-
tion itself. The facts also differ because Article V provides written rules of recogni-
tion, whereas the Rhode Island Charter had no provision for amendment.
Furthermore, the principles governing ratification of amendments proposed by a
convention may differ from those governing amendments proposed by an ordinary
legislature.
The status of the 27th Amendment, however, was not clear despite the pres-
ence of written rules of recognition. Indeed, Paulsen asserts that existing interpre-
tations of Article V's procedures by the courts and constitutional scholars are all
"flawed as a matter of textual interpretation, descriptive accuracy, or constitu-
tional logic." Id. at 682. As an alternative, Paulsen proposes a formalist "concur-
rent legislation" model, pursuant to which an "amendment results whenever there
concurrently exists a valid, unrepealed enactment of Congress proposing an
amendment and the valid, unrepealed enactments of thirty-eight state legislatures
ratifying that proposal." Id. at 722. For a different view, see, Stewart Dalzell and
Eric Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 220 Years Too Late? 62 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 501 (1994), who argue that Article V requires contemporaneous approval
from Congress and the state legislatures.
Although there are differences between the ratification process of the Declara-
tion of Rights and that of the 27th Amendment, the 27th Amendment's certifica-
tion by the executive and legislative branches supports the thesis that one or more
branches of the government of Rhode Island could now certify the Declaration of
Rights of 1790 after more than two hundred years since its ratification.
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of Rhode Island because, even if ratified, the federal Bill of Rights
would only protect the people of Rhode Island from encroachment
of their rights by the federal government.
5. THE STATUTORY BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1798
The Rhode Island General Assembly enacted legislation to cre-
ate a Digest of Laws in 1798. 5 7 The act which authorized the codi-
fication also provided that the Charter of 1663, the Declaration of
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution of
the United States and President Washington's Farewell Address
would be published with the new Digest of Laws. It is significant,
however, that the Rhode Island Bill of Rights was not printed with
the new digest.
The codification of law included a new statutory bill of rights,
titled, "An Act declaratory of certain Rights of the People of this
State." This Bill of Rights was a pale shadow of the rights con-
tained in the Declaration of Rights of 1790. A comparison of the
two documents reveals that they share little in substance or lan-
guage. Indeed, the 1798 statute focused exclusively on matters of
criminal and civil procedure. 58 This statutory bill of rights was fol-
lowed in the Digest by an important act on religious freedom, re-
flecting Rhode Island's history of religious toleration.
At the present time, there is no explanation as to why the
Rhode Island Declaration of Rights was not included in the Digest,
although its absence signifies a glaring deficiency in the written
protection of individual rights under Rhode Island law at that
time. Either these rights were viewed merely as rights limiting
federal power or the Rhode Island General Assembly deliberately
overlooked the statement of the people in convention. The legisla-
ture's record of opposing constitutional change, up to and including
57. A copy of this legislative enactment can be found in the Rhode Island Di-
gest of Laws of 1798. The Digest was originally printed as The Public Laws of the
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Providence, (1798). The Digest
was recently reprinted as The First Laws of the State of Rhode Island, (1983).
58. The statutory bill of rights corresponds only to Sections 8-10 and 12-14 of
the Rhode Island Bill of Rights. In addition, it adds sections on grand jury indict-
ments and double jeopardy (Section 3) bail and habeas corpus (Section 5), nonim-
prisonment for debtors (Section 7) and ex post facto laws (Section 8). The statutory
bill of rights ignores the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, most notably: popu-
lar sovereignty, separation of powers, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly,
the right to bear arms, civil jury trial.
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the Dorr Rebellion, suggests that the legislature may have inten-
tionally marginalized the Declaration of Rights, given its radical
proposals.
Members of the General Assembly may have been opposed to
one or more substantive provisions of the Declaration of Rights. It
is perhaps more than a coincidence that the statutory bill of rights
failed to guarantee the right to jury tiial "in controversies respect-
ing property, and in suits between man and man" (Section 11,
Rhode Island Declaration of Rights of 1790). The right to a jury
trial had been the subject of litigation in Rhode Island during the
1780s. The famous precedent for judicial review, Trevett v. Wee-
den, addressed the Rhode Island's legislature's refusal to provide
for jury trial for violations of its paper money legislation. 59 In gen-
eral, the narrow scope of the statutory bill of rights suggests that
the legislature was unwilling to codify broad civil rights.
In addition, the General Assembly would have been forced to
call a constitutional convention to replace the Charter govern-
ment's legislative supremacy had they recognized the validity of
the Rhode Island Declaration of Rights, because Section 5 of the
Declaration of Rights required "That the legislature, executive,
and judiciary powers of government should be separate and
distinct . . ." There was no such separation of powers under the
Charter; rather, the legislature was clearly in control of the other
branches.60
From the 1780s until the 1840s, Rhode Island government was
dominated by supporters of the Charter. Because a majority of the
Rhode Island General Assembly supported the Charter, they had
good reason to ignore the constitutional status of the 1790 Declara-
tion of Rights. Indeed, the legislature consistently rejected efforts
to draft a written constitution from the 1770s until the 1840s, at
which time they reluctantly acquiesced to demands for reform
when faced with popular revolt.61
59. For a clear account of the Trevett case, see Polishook, supra note 18 at 134-
142.
60. See id. at 24-27, for a discussion of legislative omnipotence under the
Charter; see also, Conley, supra note 5 at 36-46.
61. Between 1777 and 1824, all efforts to hold a convention to draft a state
constitution were rebuffed by the state legislature. See Conley, supra note 5 at 66-
68, 162-167, 171, 177; Polishook, supra note 18 at 44-45. There were "unsuccess-
ful" conventions held in 1824 and 1834.
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The Rhode Island Declaration of Rights also articulated a view
of popular sovereignty that might have been opposed by a majority
of the state legislature. Section 3 of the Bill of Rights62 established
a very broad right to alter and abolish the existing government. It
states, "That the powers of government may be reassumed by the
people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness..."
Although it may be impossible to know the sentiments of the legis-
lature regarding popular sovereignty in 1798, during the 1830s
and 1840s Charter supporters rejected this broad definition of the
power to alter and abolish. Indeed, the Constitution of 1842,
drafted by Charter supporters, expressed a more narrow view of
popular sovereignty,
In the words of the Father of his Country, we declare that the
basis of our political systems is the right of the people to
make and alter their constitutions of government; but that
the constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an
explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obli-
gatory upon all.6 3
This provision was intended to limit constitutional change to
higher lawmaking authorized and certified by the existing govern-
ment. There was no such limitation on the right of popular sover-
eignty in the Rhode Island Declaration of Rights of 1790.
Supporters of the Charter also frequently argued that it was
impossible to amend the Charter because there was no provision
for amendment. The doctrine that the Charter was not amendable
provides the clearest, and most plausible, justification for ignoring
the constitutional status of the Rhode Island Bill of Rights. In
practice, however, even a weak version of popular sovereignty un-
dercuts any argument that the Charter cannot be amended. In-
deed, the General Assembly had amended the Charter on behalf of
the people in 1776 when, without any consultation with the people
whatsoever, they removed the king as the sovereign power in the
Rhode Island Charter. Ratification of the Articles of Confederation
and of the U.S. Constitution also effected pro tanto an amendment
of the state's Charter.64 It is difficult to see how these legislative
62. It is worthy of note again that this was the only section of the Declaration
of Rights not based on a similar provision from the Virginia ratifying convention.
63. R.I. Const., art. I, § 1. This passage by George Washington was from his
Farewell Address, which was included in the 1798 Digest of Laws by order of the
state legislature.
64. Amar, supra note 6 at 1049.
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acts of higher lawmaking should be any more legitimate than a
similar act of higher lawmaking undertaken by the people in
convention.
6. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS: IS IT STILL VALID?
The Rhode Island Declaration of Rights of 1790 may have been
repealed or revised by subsequent higher lawmaking. Since the
convention of 1790, there have been two constitutions validly en-
acted in Rhode Island.65 The present status of the 1790 bill of
rights requires an examination of the 1842 Constitution and the
1986 Constitution.
A. The 1842 Constitution
In order to determine whether the 1842 Constitution repealed
the Declaration of Rights, it is necessary to examine the enactment
provisions of the 1842 Constitution and the proceedings of that
convention. Neither source provides an explicit reference to the
Rhode Island Declaration of Rights, which is not surprising since it
was not recognized as higher law by the Charter government.6 6
Article XIV of the 1842 Constitution, titled "Of the Adoption of
this Constitution," made no explicit reference to the Charter or
preexisting rights. Its references to prior laws and rights were lim-
ited to the following sentences,
All statutes, public and private, not repugnant to this consti-
tution, shall continue in force until they expire by their own
limitation, or are repealed by the general assembly. All char-
65. For the purposes of this article, the People's Constitution of 1842 was not
higher law because, regardless of the historical merits of the arguments, the issue
was legally resolved. Rhode Island courts concluded that the People's Constitution,
which was drafted in a convention and approved in a referendum without govern-
mental sponsorship or support, was never valid.
66. It is not surprising that the supporters of the Charter, who wrote the 1842
Constitution, did not refer to the 1790 Bill of Rights. It is surprising, however,
that Thomas Wilson Dorr, who led the unsuccessful rebellion against the Charter
government, did not assert that the Declaration of Rights was higher law. Dorr's
failure to invoke the Declaration is troubling, but not fatal, to my view of the Dec-
laration of Rights because Dorr, himself, believed in an extreme version of popular
sovereignty. Dorr may not have argued this position for strategic reasons. Indeed,
Dorr was unlikely to convince a legislature that agreed to hold the convention that
drafted the 1842 Constitution only under duress, that the Declaration of Rights of
1790 was higher law.
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ters, contracts, judgments, actions and rights of action shall
be as valid as if this constitution had not been made.
The 1842 Constitution, then, did not explicitly repeal earlier
higher lawmaking by the people. As a result, the Rhode Island
Declaration of Rights may not have been repealed by the 1842
Constitution.
In order to determine whether the Rhode Island Bill of Rights
was revised or superseded, in whole or in part, by the 1842 Consti-
tution, it is necessary to compare the substantive provisions of the
two documents. Article I of the 1842 Constitution was titled, "Dec-
laration of Certain Constitutional Rights and Principles." The
twenty-three sections of Article I overlapped substantively with
the declaration ratified in 1790.
Sections 5 through 14 of Article I of the 1842 Constitution in-
corporated, with almost no changes, the language and meaning of
the ten sections of the statutory declaration of rights of 1798. As
discussed above, several of those sections granted similar rights to
those provided in the 1790 Declaration of Rights. Section 3, which
provided for religious freedom, was also based on a statute in the
1798 Digest of Laws.67 Nowhere in Article I, however, did the 1842
convention use the language of the 1790 document.
Three sections of Article I of the 1842 Constitution declared
rights that were not mentioned in the 1790 declaration. 68 Several
sections corresponded to rights enumerated in the 1790 document,
but absent from the statutory Bill of Rights of 1798.69 In many of
these similar sections, however, the rights were substantively
quite different. There was a direct conflict in only one section, that
67. See Digest of Laws of 1798, at 84. It should be also noted that the Declara-
tion of Rights of 1790 contained a section on religious liberty.
68. Section 4 prohibited slavery. Section 16 added a takings clause. Section
17 discussed fishing and shore rights.
69. Section 16 (1842), guaranteeing the right to jury trial, corresponded to
Section 11 (1790). It should be noted again that this right was not made explicit in
the 1798 statute. Section 18, on military subordination to the civilian, corre-
sponded to Section 17, although the provision dealing with martial law was differ-
ent presumably because of the use of martial law during the Dorr Rebellion.
Section 19, on quartering troops, also corresponded to Section 17. Section 20, on
freedom of the press, was similar to section XVI, although it added a libel provi-
sion. Section 21, on assembly and redress of grievances, was similar to Section 15,
although it did not mention the right to instruct representatives. Section 22, on
bearing arms, corresponded to Section 17. In none of these sections, however, did
the 1842 Constitution use the language of the 1790 Bill of Rights.
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governing popular sovereignty. 70 In general, Article 1 of the 1842
Constitution apparently repealed Section 3 (in part) and super-
seded Sections 4, and 7-17, of the 1790 Bill of Rights.7 1
According to this analysis, Sections 1, 2, 3 (in part), 5-7, and 18
of the Rhode Island Bill of Rights may have remained in force after
the passage of the 1842 Constitution, unless contradicted by other
articles of that Constitution. The "surviving" provisions of the
1790 Declaration of Rights, however, may also have been repealed
or superseded by some of the more than forty amendments which
were adopted between 1842 and 1986.
70. Popular sovereignty was central to the major constitutional crisis, the
Dorr Rebellion, which led to the sponsorship of a constitutional convention by the
legislature in 1842 and the subsequent enactment of the 1842 Constitution. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the 1842 Constitution included a much narrower
statement of the right to alter and abolish. Section 1 (1842) states,
in the words of the Father of this Country, we declare: 'That the basis of
our political systems is the right of the people to make and alter their
constitutions of government; but that the constitution which at any time
exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is
sacredly obligatory upon all.
This provision essentially declared that the right to alter and abolish was contin-
gent upon authentication by the existing government. In contrast, Section 3 (1790)
had provided in part, "That the powers of government may be reassumed by the
people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness." There seems to
be a direct conflict between the two provisions such that the first portion of Section
3 should be considered repealed by Article I, Section 1 of the Rhode Island Consti-
tution of 1842. There is, however, a possible middle ground suggested by Professor
Akhil Amar. "Although effective implementation of the right of the People to alter
or abolish their government requires assistance from the ordinary organs of gov-
ernment... the right does not and should not depend on the will of ordinary gov-
ernment." Amar, supra note 7 at 1065, n. 81.
The 1842 Constitution was later construed by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court as prohibiting a constitutional convention in an 1883 advisory opinion. In re
the Constitutional Convention, 14 R.I. 649 (1883). This opinion was reversed in an
advisory opinion handed down by the state supreme court on April 1, 1935. In re
the Constitutional Convention, 55 R.I. 56 (1935). Hubbard, The Issue of Constitu-
tional Conventions in Rhode Island, 30 Am. Poli. Sci. Rev. 537 (1936). On the Dorr
Rebellion, see Conley, supra note 5 and William Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of
the U.S. Constitution (1972).
71. This is a preliminary conclusion. Close analysis of particular provisions
such as the right to instruct representatives and the warning against standing
armies in Sections 15 and 17 (1790), respectively, may reveal that they have not
been superseded. The goal in examining these two documents in this article is
primarily to illustrate the analysis which must be undertaken in order to deter-
mine the status of the rights declared in the Bill of Rights, rather than present a
definitive answer regarding each provision.
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B. The 1986 Constitution
The 1986 Constitution of Rhode Island did not effect a general
repeal of the 1790 Declaration of Rights. In Article XV, titled
"General Transition," Section 1 states "the rights and duties of all
public bodies shall remain as if this Constitution had not been
adopted with the exception of such changes as are contained in this
Constitution."72 Under this provision, the 1790 Declaration of
Rights survives the new constitution except for provisions contrary
to the new document.
In order to determine which, if any provisions of the Declara-
tion of Rights of 1790 could be enforced today, it would be neces-
sary to examine each provision that "survived" the ratification of
the 1842 Constitution, as amended, and the case law interpreting
it. If those provisions are not contrary to the Constitution of 1986,
they may be enforceable as constitutional rights in the State of
Rhode Island today.
7. CONCLUSION
The Declaration of Rights passed by the convention in Rhode
Island that ratified the U.S. Constitution may, in small part, still
be enforceable. Although this article has raised more questions
than it has resolved, the following facts seem to be clear:
1.) The Declaration of Rights of 1790 was drafted by the first
session of the ratifying convention, submitted to the people and
ratified by second session of the ratifying convention;
2.) The Declaration of Rights as drafted was intended to ap-
ply to the "people of the state;" and
3.) Applying the principles of popular sovereignty, the Declara-
tion of Rights could have been enforced as constitutional law in
Rhode Island.
This article presents no definitive reasons why the document
was not enforced. The history of Rhode Island from the 1780's to
the 1840's suggests many possible motives for the General Assem-
bly to ignore its declarations, especially the provisions regarding
popular sovereignty and suffrage. It is also noteworthy that Seth
72. Article XV, Section 1, continues as follows: "All laws, ordinances, regula-
tions and rules of court not contrary to, or inconsistent with, the provisions of this
Constitution shall remain in force, until they shall expire by their own limitation
or shall be altered or repealed pursuant to this Constitution."
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Luther, Thomas Wilson Dorr and Benjamin F. Hallett cited the
document.
Because the document has been virtually ignored since its rat-
ification, the discussion of its status after ratification and after
1842 is largely a thought experiment. If it is possible for higher
lawmaking to occur without ex post valorization by the existing
government, then it is possible that some provisions of the Bill of
Rights of 1790 may be enforceable today. Even if ex post authenti-
cation was a requirement for higher lawmaking in Rhode Island in
1790, the General Assembly's acceptance of the bill of ratification
may have been sufficient. As a practical matter, however, the Dec-
laration of Rights would require certification by at least one branch
of state government in order to enter into force today. In order to
accept the Declaration of Rights, the government would have to
embrace the very strong belief in popular sovereignty and the
higher lawmaking powers of conventions which underlies the anal-
ysis in this article. These notions of popular sovereignty are simi-
lar to the ideas of Thomas Wilson Dorr and others who were
defeated in the Dorr Rebellion. 73
Authentication by the government is particularly important in
Rhode Island because the people and government of Rhode Island
resolved the authentication issue in the Dorr Rebellion of 1842. It
would be necessary for the present government, or at least one
branch of it, to declare that the Bill of Rights of 1790 was an au-
thentic act of the people. As a result, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island or the General Assembly could now valorize this two hun-
dred year-old statement that was ratified by the people in
convention.
73. See supra note 5.

